Eliot A. CohenSupreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime

At a time when a U.S. invasion of Iraq appears imminent and inevitable, this learned study of both the traditional and the more recent, iconoclastic theories of the proper relationship between the policies of state and the direction of military strategy documents the difficulties and dangers of preventing limited warfare from escalating beyond any semblance of civilian control. Supreme Command adds context and texture to the serious student's understanding of the history of the twentieth century and its wars, warriors, and statesmen, brilliantly limning biographical sketches of four statesmen who mastered military strategy and effectively controlled the apparently unstoppable momentum of battles by constant dialogues with generals quite willing to disagree with them, and who constructively shaped and limited the purposes and conduct of the wars over which they presided politically. Like characters in a great novel, Lincoln, Grant, and Meade; Clemenceau, Foch, and Petain; Churchill, Brooke, and Montgomery; Ben-Gurion, Yigal Allon, and Yigal Yadin - all come memorably alive as fallible beings with strengths and weaknesses, successes and failures. With an undeniably timely sense of foreboding, the author - a professor of strategic studies at Johns Hopkins University - examines the applicability of these and other historical precedents to the nuclear era, in which the dangers of war as the crudest tool of diplomacy threaten to outweigh by far its usefulness as an instrument of statecraft and polity.

Few authors get the endorsement that comes from seeing the President of the United States carrying their book around; even fewer get the satisfaction of seeing their theories proved by events. Mr. Cohen is a member of both groups.Of course the photos of Bush holding his book have long been forgotten by everyone else, and the recent CYA attempts by Generals Sanchez and Keane have not been recognized for what they are by anyone else, but I'll bet Mr. Cohen has figured it out: Bush not only read his book but apparently took it to heart and implemented it.It is clear now that Bush had to hunt through a Pentagon full of McClellans until he found his Grant and then had to defend said Grant (Petraeus) and his strategy against a whole host of critics within the Pentagon as well as without until victory was too obvious to ignore.Mr. Cohen, take a bow. You've earned it.

Those interested in military and civilian affairs, as we have all become to some degree as of late, should be enormously appreciative for Cohen's having looked beyond the water's edge for examples of leadership - this is rare in too much of American scholarship. The book gives full and equal chapter space to describe and evaluate Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, and Ben-Gurion - all powerful, and determined leaders regardless of whether one subscribes to their politics or not. As Clausewitz wrote in 1834: "War is nothing but a continuation of politics with the admixture of other means." Yet, in many industrialized democracies we face a seeming wane of confidence in our civilian leaders' abilities to guide the "dogs of war" to a proper and honorable victory. Cohen addresses the nature of these leaders, in their capacity to achieve victory as civilian commanders; however, we take for granted their capabilities and uniqueness as individuals - could we expect the same from George W. Bush as was demonstrated by Clemenceau or Churchill?The study seems flawed in some minor, but irritating aspect as a result of this. We do not create the rule, merely because it has proven successful in four remarkable instances.I digress though, and would make the potential reader aware that the book ought to be read (should your interests be piqued by the intricacies of diplomacy, government and war), to gain a greater understanding of true leaders, and the manner in which they face the high-stakes challenges that ultimately test their lives' preparedness, guile, and determination. When one knows little of military affairs, and much of politics, it takes a dogged individual to tell those who know much of military affairs, and little of politics that they will go so far and no further upon the battlefield. It takes a lucky individual to be successful in such affairs. The text loses a star for this singular, but ultimately profound flaw, and garners four for its adept and lucid explanations of these four courageous and politically clear-minded men.

A very well researched and written book that provides a great example of how to use individual case studies in a larger product. I learned a lot from this book. I first purchased it on Audible, and then bought the paperback version to make it easier to reference and focus on specific parts of the book to support my own research.

Clear compelling thesis on a vital subject, developed by the stories of 4 wartime leaders. I had read a great deal about Lincoln and Churchill of course; not nearly as much on Clemenceau and Ben Gurion. I learned much new about them all.Cohen brilliantly captures the qualities of leadership which matter most in any walk of life.Highly recommended.

The book quality is good and the delivery time was correct.

This book is a must read for the subject of civil-military relationships. It demonstrates that successful political leaders in war are ones who 'lead' the military ones rather than simply hire generals. Even if a leader is inexperience in military operations, they can be successful if they study war and ask questions, and challenge assumptions. This mode of operation extends to other fields even in sport management.

Excellent choice for anyone who's interested in Political Science

ottimo

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Book just as described, very good condition. Arrived on time and well packed. Excellent.